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Not the least of the pleasures of membership in this distinguished group
invited to praise Ira Ellman was the opportunity it gave me to renew old and
dear friendships with Arizona State faculty members and their spouses, to
come back to the scene of my "adjunct visitor" gig last year, to see once
again an effective dean whom I greatly admire. More important, the
occasion allows me to praise publicly a scholar whose creative thinking,
academic writing, legislative drafting and public performances as Reporter
for the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution I have long respected.
The scope and depth of Ira Ellman's scholarship are more than
impressive - they are astounding. As his speech this afternoon plainly
demonstrates, he obviously knows well and understands-and of course
uses effectively in his own scholarship-the principles and literature of
demography, economics, and statistics, as well as their failings and
occasional misuse. His applications of coordinate fields of social science,
his great analytic powers, his drafting skills, his common sense and good
will, have been obvious in everything he has touched. Indeed, as I said at a
meeting of the Advisory Committee, the Institute's Principles prove the
elegance of his conceptual as well as his drafting skills. His scholarship, as
far as I know it, has always been unflinching; he has been willing politely to
disagree with critics, refusing to succumb to political correctness.
His talk today exhibits these qualities. It ranges across many fields of
family law with rare intelligence, ties lines of doctrine and inquiry into a
* This essay is an extended and footnoted version of remarks delivered at the investiture
of Professor Ira Ellman as the Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar at the
Arizona State University College of Law on March 25, 2003.
t William L. Prosser Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Minnesota.
I. See generally A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 7 (2003) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. I cannot pass on without
emphasizing the careful drafting of the Principles' "black letter" as well as the grace and
intelligence of the Reporters' comments. Each reading increases my knowledge of the subject
matter as well as my admiration for the quality of the enterprise.
ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL
novel and interesting package, and explores in a challenging fashion
questions most family law scholars would be happy to leave to jurisprudes.
I am not alone in drawing these conclusions-obviously not on this
panel nor among academics generally. Consider only one of the evaluations
of Ira I have received from other family law scholars:
Ira is a giant in the field of family law. He has had an important
influence on the subject in three ways. First, he is a leading
scholar of family law. His work over the course of his career has
been innovative, provocative, and very influential. He is a major
player, whose scholarship is read and much admired by other
family law scholars. Second, he is the author of one of the most
respected family law casebooks. Finally, through his work as
Chief Reporter of the American Law Institute's Principles, he has
shaped one of the most important and far-reaching reform projects
in family law in the last generation .... My overall assessment of
Ira's scholarship is that it is among the best in our field. As a




Among other provocative challenges in Ira's talk today is this claim:
specific legal rules can seldom adequately regulate, and contract analogies
should not be permitted to govern, either the financial dynamics of
marriages or the financial terms of spouses' divorces-at least in part
because, as he indicates in a captivating phrase, marriages are not
hamburgers.3 Committed couples' relationships grow and change over
time, and the promises and exchanges are seldom if ever immediate or
determinable in the fashion of a restaurant bill. The relationship itself is
more important than the individual negotiations in which couples
continually engage or the individual outcomes of those negotiations. As Ira
expressed the matter: "The reciprocal nature of a successful marriage gives
it a superficial resemblance to a bargained-for exchange, which makes it
easy to think that this apparent exchange is the basis of the marriage's legal
obligations. But we must remain clear about the difference.' '4 "If lovers
have bargains, they are complex emotional bargains, and they themselves
2. Letter from a confidential informant to Robert J. Levy, William L. Prosser Professor
of Law Emeritus, University of Minnesota (Feb. 4, 2002) (on file with University of Minnesota
Law School Library).




may not easily identify the quids and quos. ' 5  How these insights are
labeled-sociology, family systems or home economics-is unimportant;
their essence describes our personal and familial experiences and
understanding, not to mention our moral approval, of marriage and other
"intimate associations." These premises lead to a conceptual structure for
the formulation of family law doctrine. Thus, to cite one example, "the law
[] needs a rule for allocating finances at divorce," but the rule cannot rely on
using the particular parties' understanding.6 Rather (if I may be permitted
to simplify greatly a complex system), the rules should rely upon
presumptions and should vary in accordance with the length of the parties'
relationship, their relative earning capacity when the relationship
terminates, and the reasons for any gap in the parties' earning capacities.
Yet the rules should not be entirely inflexible-adjustments can be made.
There should be "an escape hatch a court can rely upon in exceptional cases,
after making appropriate findings."7 These assumptions animate many of
the Principles' doctrinal formulas. They respond importantly to several
decades of family law scholarship describing and criticizing the breadth of
5. Id.
6. Id. at 713.
7. Id. For criticism of the "escape hatches" in the Principles, see David Westfall,
Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The A.L.'s Questionable Recommendations for Spousal
Support and Division of Property on Divorce, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming
2003). For a proposal that divorce courts should conduct what might be called a "judicial
inquest" of the spouses' marriage and dispense financial benefits in accordance with the history
of the marriage and the spouses' future opportunities, see Deborah Rhode and Martha Minow,
Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Reform,
in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 201 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herman Hill Kay
eds., 1990). The proposal was severely criticized in Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act - and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies,
1991 BYU L. REV. 43, 65-66 (1991):
The proposal would authorize judges to examine the course and history of a
couple's marriage and determine their financial situations immediately and
for the future (if one spouse does not have cash currently to pay off the
other) in accordance with the judge's personal, discretionary evaluation of
the relative contributions of the spouses to their present financial condition
and professional status .... Anyone familiar with the course of American
family law knows that judges have regularly used indeterminate doctrinal
standards to incorporate 'fault' notions in the administration of divorce.
(footnotes omitted).
see also Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1119
(1989) (arguing for clear and simple rules to equalize spouses' post-divorce income because
judges are still predominantly male and the judicial system will reflect the society's gender
bias).
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trial court freedom from rules and the more than occasional unconstrained
misuse of that discretion.
8
The structural policy problem, one that has concerned a great many
family law scholars in recent decades, is how to balance rule with
discretion: To what extent should legislative doctrine turn away from
reliance on judges' understanding of and sensitivity to the facts of
individual cases in order to protect divorcing couples from the dangers of
judges' exercise of largely unreviewable authority?9 And if, given the
history of judicial family law doctrinal administration, it is appropriate to
limit severely judicial case by case decisional freedom, what is the cost of
such a policy to particular classes of litigants when the number of classes
and the sizes of each will seldom if ever be known either to legislative or to
judicial decision-makers? As a respectful tribute to Ira and to the Institute's
Principles, I would like to offer some tentative thoughts on one aspect of
the subject this afternoon.
The context for my discussion is provided by an interesting recent
prenuptial contract case that caught my attention. Prenuptial agreements,
one of the ways in which couples can privately order their post-divorce
financial affairs, are the doctrinal focus of chapter seven of the Principles.
Consistent with the Reporters' view, chapter seven offers "an approach to
premarital agreements which tries to respect both the status and private-
ordering aspects of marriage."' 0 The discussion which follows is designed
8. For a collection of cases, see Levy, supra note 7, at 66 n.84; see also infra notes 39-41
and accompanying text.
9. The jurisprudential problem is hardly new or limited to family law, and it has been
examined by a great many, justifiably famed scholars. I make no claim to originality for the
general comments about the problem. For a classic analysis in a different family law context,
see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991); see also Levy, supra note 7. For an account
of the dilemmas in the context of criminal sentencing, see Richard S. Frase, Implementing
Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279 (1993).
10. Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALl Principles of Family Dissolution, 8
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 231, 231 (2001). My colleague Brian Bix's excellent discussion
describes and analyzes the Principles' policies in a careful and thoughtful fashion and relates
them to the perennial dispute between those who emphasize the "public status" aspect of
marriage, leading to the position that the state should set the terms for marriages, and those who
emphasize the "intimate relationship aspect" of marriage, leading to greater receptivity to
parties' private ordering. Id. Professor Bix's analyses of Principles' doctrines, which have
substantially influenced my own thoughts on many of the issues, are clearly reflected in the
following discussion. Another colleague, Judith T. Younger, has been a leading scholar in the
field for many years. See generally, Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 697 (2001); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An
Update, 9 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1992).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS
more to articulate my own continuing questions about the chapter's policies
than to criticize (or even necessarily to disagree with) their work product.
III.
Consider the case of Manny and Carla." The couple began dating in
1980, shortly after Manny graduated from law school at the University of
California, and was working toward his CPA accreditation at the Arthur
Anderson accounting firm. Carla, a college graduate, was an executive in
the music and entertainment industries. By 1981 the two were discussing
marriage. Manny, troubled about a friend who had been "wronged in a
divorce settlement and lost his house," insisted that he would marry only
under the following conditions:
1. Carla would always be employed;
2. Each party's income and property would be treated as non-
marital;
3. Each party would own a home to return to if the marriage were
to fail;
4. Carla would never get fat.
Although these terms were never reduced to writing, Carla agreed to all of
them. Manny and Carla were not especially wealthy-when they married
almost five years later, shortly after Manny left Arthur Anderson to become
an associate in a Seattle law firm, each was earning somewhere between
$40,000 and $50,000 annually. Manny had accumulated a significant but
not large amount of nonmarital property prior to the marriage.
Between 1981, when their discussion of marriage occurred and Manny
declared his conditions, and 2000, when they separated, Manny and Carla
continually affirmed their agreement through words and actions.
The record reflects painstaking and meticulous effort to maintain
separate finances and property. During their marriage Carla and
Manny deposited their incomes into separate accounts which they
used for their personal expenses and investments. In 1990, after
the birth of their first child, they opened a joint checking account
in order to handle certain agreed household expenses. Manny and
Carla deposited a specified amount to the joint account, and they
reimbursed their personal accounts from the joint account if they
happened to use personal funds for household expenses. They
11. The case is cited, and my reasons for postponing its citation are provided infra note 39
and accompanying text. Quotations in the text are taken from the opinion and only first names
of parties are used.
35:0723] 727
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took turns managing that account. By 2000, when Manny and
Carla separated, they had accumulated minimal community
property in the form of joint accounts and jointly purchased
possessions. They held numerous investment, bank, and
retirement accounts as individuals, and the spouse who had created
and contributed to those accounts was considered the sole owner
and manager of the assets in those accounts. The primary
beneficiaries of their individual accounts were the parties'
children, or alternatively, the estate of the spouse who funded
them.
During their relationship, Manny purchased three houses as his
separate property, securing financing separately in all instances by
signing promissory notes or asking his sister to co-sign. The first
house he bought was a duplex in Oakland, which he purchased in
1982 in order to fulfill the third condition of the prenuptial
agreement. The latter two houses, both located in Seattle, served
as the family's primary residences. In accordance with the parties'
agreement, Manny treated these houses as his separate property by
paying for maintenance, improvements and the down payment and
mortgage with funds from his separate accounts.
After his move to Seattle, Manny's economic circumstances improved
sensationally. By 2000, when the two separated, Manny had become a
partner in the law firm at which he was working, and was earning more than
$1 million annually. Carla's salary had remained the same. By 2001 when
their divorce trial began and the validity of their oral prenuptial agreement
was to be determined, Carla was what the Washington Court of Appeals
later called "under-employed." By the time the divorce was granted,
Manny's share of the spouses' total property was $2.3 million; Carla's share
would have amounted to $600,000. Seeking unsuccessfully to settle the
case without a judicial determination of the agreement's validity, Manny
offered Carla an additional $300,000 that their agreement would have
allocated to him.
12
Because no state has yet adopted the financial provisions of the
Principles, it is difficult to predict how its absolute and presumptive rules
and "escape hatches" would be interpreted in Manny and Carla's case. But
12. The Washington Court of Appeals never mentioned the children except in the fashion
quoted in the text and in its findings respecting the allocation of child support-findings not
relevant to the issue examined in this essay. But see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
From the court's remarks about the spouses' administration of the financial aspects of child
care, one could infer that the spouses shared parenting responsibilities.
13. West Virginia has adopted chapter two of Principles in its entirety. W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-9-101 to -163, -201 to -209, -301 to -303, -401 to -403, -501 (Michie 2001); see
also infra note 52.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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trying to apply chapter seven to this "hypothetical" may well shed light on
both the rules and on the appropriate legal response to agreements like
Manny and Carla's.
IV.
First, a short summary of chapter seven is in order. To be enforceable, a
prenuptial agreement must fulfill both procedural and substantive fairness
requirements.' 4  Section 7.04 states the procedural requisites. The
agreement must "be in writing signed by both parties,... the party waiving
rights [must] have an at least approximate knowledge of the other party's
assets, and ... the agreement [must] not have been the product of duress.'
5
Section 7.05, which imposes the substantive fairness requirement,
focuses on the time of enforcement rather than the time of execution of the
agreement 16  and exchanges for the common commercial-law term
"unconscionable" the phrase "when enforcement would work a substantial
injustice."' 17 A party contesting enforcement of a prenuptial agreement on
14. PRINCIPLES § 7.01(4) (2002).
15. Bix, supra note 10, at 236 (footnotes omitted from this and subsequent quotations). As
Professor Bix points out, many of the procedural requirements are fairly standard pre-
Principles, common law requirements, as well as requirements included in the UNIFORM
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002), a product of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Bix, supra note 10, at 236 &
n. 21. The Uniform Act differs from the Principles in a number of ways that need not concern
us here. The Principles provide a rebuttable presumption of no duress if the agreement was
signed more than thirty days prior to the marriage and each signatory was advised and had an
opportunity to obtain independent counsel or, where one of the signatories did not have counsel,
the agreement indicates in clear language the rights being waived. Id. at 236. Unlike most prior
law and the provisions of the rules of civil procedure in most states, in the absence of
compliance with these procedural requirements, Section 7.04 places the burden of proving
absence of duress on the signatory seeking enforcement. Id. at 236-37.
16. Many of the states which adhere to still developing common-law doctrines determine
enforceability at the time of enforcement, while some continue to look at fairness only at the
time of execution. See Bix, supra note 10, at 237.
17. Id. In PRINCIPLES § 7.05 illus. 4, at 990-91 (2003), the Reporters indicate that a
premarital agreement enforceable despite the "substantial injustice" strictures of section 7.05
might nonetheless be deemed "unconscionable" by reference to the general limitations on
contracting (judged as of the time of contracting) imposed by common law or statutory
"unconscionability" doctrine. See § 7.01 cmt. d, at 948:
Among the ordinary principles of contract law also applicable to the
contracts addressed by this Chapter is the rule of § 208 of the Restatement
Second, Contracts, allowing a court to decline to enforce a contract term that
it finds "unconscionable at the time the contract is made." Courts have
sometimes gone beyond this rule to deny enforcement, under the rubric of
unconscionability, to a premarital agreement whose terms seem very unfair
as of the time enforcement is sought, even though its terms were not
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fairness grounds must prove initially the existence of one of three
"triggering" events: "the passage of a significant amount of time; the birth
or adoption of a child to a couple who 'had no children in common' at the
time of the agreement; [or] a significant and unexpected change in
circumstances." '1 8 Once one spouse proves one of these triggering events,
the inquiry into "substantial injustice" includes traditional prenuptial
agreement validity criteria but travels in new directions as well:
(3) The party claiming that enforcement of an agreement would
work a substantial injustice has the burden of proof on that
question. In deciding whether the agreement's application to the
parties' circumstances at dissolution would work a substantial
injustice, a court should consider all of the following:
(a) the magnitude of the disparity between the
outcome under the agreement and the outcome
under otherwise prevailing legal principles;
(b) for those marriages of limited duration in
which it is practical to ascertain, the difference
between the circumstances of the objecting party
if the agreement is enforced, and that party's
likely circumstances had the marriage never taken
place;
(c) whether the purpose of the agreement was to
benefit or protect the interests of third parties
(such as children from a prior relationship),
whether that purpose is still relevant, and whether
the agreement's terms were reasonably designed
to serve it;
(d) the impact of the agreement's enforcement
upon the children of the parties.
19
unconscionable as of the time of contracting .... Section 7.05 does not rely
upon the doctrine of unconscionability, however, for which this Chapter
adheres to the approach of the Restatement Second of Contracts.
To whatever extent the doctrine is general with unfixed boundaries (and the Reporters
acknowledge that "[t]he legal conclusion of unconscionability is highly fact-specific," id. cmt.
e, at 948), judges' discretion to enforce or refuse to enforce individual premarital agreements is
expanded.
18. Bix, supra note 10, at 238 (footnotes omitted). The actual "unexpected change"
language reads: "there has been a change in circumstances that has a substantial impact on the
parties or their children, but when they executed the agreement the parties probably did not
anticipate either the change, or its impact." PRINCIPLES, § 7.05(2)(c), at 983.
19. PRINCIPLES, § 7.05(3) at 983.
[Ariz. St. L.J.730
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How would these chapter seven enforcement requirements play out in
Manny and Carla's case? Obviously, I cannot give certain answers, but I
can do what any good lawyer should be able to do for a client-make
ballpark predictions. As to the procedural requirements, there is no
evidence that the agreement was obtained by duress, and the agreement was
reached more than thirty days prior to the parties' wedding. There is no
evidence that Carla was advised about or given a reasonable opportunity to
retain counsel, 20 and therefore Manny would bear the burden of proving
duress.21 Yet trial judges might be influenced enough by Carla's consistent,
nineteen-year-long, post-agreement behavior to be willing to conclude that
she had waived even procedural rights of which she was not formally
informed. But despite Carla's apparent knowledge of Manny's assets both
when the agreement was reached and during the lengthy subsequent period
before and during the marriage, and despite the parties' behavior for close
to twenty years "affirming" the terms of the agreement, chapter seven
would not permit enforcement. The agreement was not originally in writing
and never reduced to writing. Section 7.04's writing requirement, unlike
some of its other procedural provisions, is absolute.
22
20. The language relating to the provision of or opportunity to retain counsel is complex.
It suffices for our purposes that it would be difficult to argue that during the five years after the
agreement and before the marriage that Carla did not have a "reasonable opportunity" to consult
independent counsel. See PRINCIPLES, § 7.04 cmt. e, at 968-69. For an extensive and
informative discussion of the intricacies and varieties of legislation and appellate decisions
respecting legal advice as a criterion of premarital agreement enforceability, see id. at 978-79.
The alternative to "assistance of independent legal counsel" within the meaning of section
7.04-that "the agreement states, in language easily understandable by an adult of ordinary
intelligence with no legal training" the nature of the rights altered, the nature of the alteration,
and notice "that the interests of the spouses ... may be adverse"---could not be fulfilled
because there was no written agreement. On the other hand, it is likely that Carla understood the
agreement. Id. § 7.04(3)(c), at 960. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. For some idea
of how constraining of prenuptial agreement negotiation the Reporters intended this requirement
to be, see PRINCIPLES § 7.04 illus. 11 and 12 at 971-72. On the other hand, as to the disclosure
of assets for purposes of compensatory payments limitations, the Reporters indicate that "a
detailed disclosure" is not necessarily required. Id. § 7.04(5), at 961. "If no such statement
[containing a list of assets, etc.] was provided, then one must examine the facts to determine
whether the spouse against whom enforcement is sought 'knew, at least approximately, the
moving party's assets and income ....' Id cmt. g, at 973. That the parties' lengthy premarital
relationship following the agreement and their lengthy marriage while affirming it would be
deemed by a court in a Principles' state sufficient to obviate such formal requisites to
enforcement of the agreement as legal advice is at least arguable.
21. The Reporters provide a sophisticated analysis of judicial approaches to the "duress"
criterion in ordinary contract as well as in premarital contract litigation; and they point out the
extent to which judicial refusals to find "voluntariness" in premarital contract cases are at least
to some extent and in some cases a substitute for conclusions about fairness or
"unconscionability." See PRINCIPLES, § 7.04 cmt. b, at 962-63.
22. The Reporters acknowledge that:
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As to substantive fairness requirements (assuming, of course, that the
absence of a writing could be overcome), the issues are more complex and
difficult to predict.23 Certainly, more than one "trigger" has occurred in
Manny and Carla's marriage: "more than a fixed number of years have
passed" since the agreement, 24 two children were born to the couple, and
Many's considerably enhanced status and income, as well as Carla's
reduced and inconsistent employment, might well be considered the
occurrence of a "change in circumstances that has a substantial impact on
the parties or their children, but when they executed the agreement the
parties probably did not anticipate either the change, or its impact.,
25
[w]hile the law is generally clear that a writing is required to establish a
premarital agreement, courts have occasionally held that the parties' conduct
during their marriage negated an earlier written agreement .... One can
perhaps understand these cases as an application of the rule that partial
performance takes a contract out of the Statute of Frauds (the contract being
one to modify the original agreement), or instead as an instance of an
equitable doctrine (most plausibly, estoppel) serving its traditional purpose of
providing relief from an injustice that would otherwise result from the
application of technical legal rules. Nothing in this section bars the
application of such equitable principles in the unusual case.
PRINCIPLES, § 7.04, cmt. a, at 974-75 (citation omitted). Are the Reporters suggesting that
Manny's deal could be enforced on equitable principles, despite the writing requirement,
because the agreement presents an "unusual case" due to the length of the parties' affirmation
and continuing commitment to their oral agreement? See also infra note 33 and accompanying
text. Professor Bix has suggested to me that, consistent with the policy underpinnings of the
Statute of Frauds, the Reporters' comments could be construed as limited to behavioral
"modifications" of a (perhaps unfair) written premarital agreement, not to behavior claimed to
validate an otherwise invalid (because unwritten) agreement. It is true that the Reporters cite a
case that involved a behavioral "rescission" of a written agreement, but the Reporters'
comments quoted above follow an acknowledgment that these cases "involve more than a claim
of an oral agreement to modify the earlier writing: They claim as well (or instead) that the
parties have in fact conducted their lives differently, and over several years at least ...." Id. §
7.04 at 974; cf id. § 7.05 cmt. a, at 984 ("Through one device or another, courts have often
applied a judicially created rule of equity that they superimpose upon the statutory rules
applicable to premarital agreements. This judicial gloss upon the statutory provisions governing
premarital agreement is appropriate, where not explicitly barred by statute.").
23. The Reporters deem their inquiry into enforceability to be an aspect of what they call
the "bargain principle"--that parties should be bound to honor agreements to which they truly
consented at an earlier time. PRINCIPLES, § 7.05 cmt. a, at 984. "Yet the frequency with which
courts have undertaken [fairness] review [of premarital agreements] is testimony to the fact that
agreements about marriage are more likely than commercial agreements to involve special facts
that test the limits of the bargain principle." Id.
24. Id. § 7.05(2)(a) at 983. As in many other PRINCIPLES' contexts, the text recommends
that the "period [be] set in a uniform rule of statewide application," and suggests ten years as an
appropriate period. Id. cmt. b, at 987.
25. Id. § 7.05(2)(c) at 983. Comment b and the illustrative cases imply that the Reporters
intended the triggering clause to be interpreted liberally. Judges should err on the side of
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Now consider the substantive standards for determining "substantial
injustice" under the provisions of section 7.05. The third and fourth
substantive fairness criteria would seem to cause no problem for Manny's
enforcement of the agreement: the agreement was almost surely not
designed to benefit third parties; and, assuming that either Manny or Carla
would be willing or could be required to support the children, the impact of
the agreement on the children would likely not preclude its enforcement.
26
As to the third criterion, the "difference between the circumstances"
standard,27 it seems clear both from the language as well as the Reporters'
comments, that the phrase was intended to apply only to relatively short
marriages, certainly to marriages that lasted less than the ten years
contemplated by subsection (3)(b).28
On the other hand, I would advise Carla that application of section
7.05(3)(a) could jeopardize the agreement-because the "disparity" of the
financial "outcome" for Carla "under the agreement and the outcome under"
the Principles and fairly standard equitable divorce property distribution
law would be of a very large "magnitude., 29 This disparity would sway
judges even though the Principles instruct them only to "consider" its
magnitude rather than be constrained by it.30 Under "prevailing" principles
Carla could expect fifty percent of the parties' property rather than the
eighteen percent she would receive as a result of the agreement; the fact that
she would receive $600,000 of her separate property goes only so far to
change the "magnitude of the disparity." Manny, after all, is walking away
from the marriage with $2.3 million in assets, a professional degree, and an
annual income of more than $1 million; an offer of a $300,000 bonus to
Carla would probably be considered an admission that the agreement did
making the "substantial injustice" inquiry contemplated by subsection (3). See id. § 7.05 illus.
1-3, at 988-89.
26. I am assuming, although the opinion does not report the fact, that Carla will be the
children's post-divorce custodian. PRINCIPLES, § 7.05 cmt. c, at 990, suggests, properly, that the
custodian and children constitute a single economic unit and that unit could easily be hurt,
despite substantial child support, by an agreement that significantly reduces financial assets
otherwise available to the unit. In this case, however, Manny's income is so substantial, and his
liability for support of the children so large, that I doubt that significant reduction of Carla's
share of the marital estate would likely be deemed to work a substantial injustice solely to
protect the children's financial interests. But that holding would obviously be the consequence
of a discretionary call by the trial judge. See also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
27. PRINCIPLES, § 7.05(3)(b).
28. Id. § 7.05(3)(b); id cmt. d, at 993-94.
29. See PRINCIPLES, § 7.05(3)(a).
30. Id. But consider id. section 7.05 cmt. c, at 991 ("Because the law governing the
financial consequences of marital dissolution necessarily reflects a judgment about what is fair
in the usual case, it provides an appropriate standard against which to examine an agreement.").
35:0723]
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not take adequate care of her.3' Carla walks away with no greater talent or
accomplishments than she had achieved when the couple married, despite
the $600,000 in assets she would receive, with the continuing burden of
restricted opportunities for career advancement to which all middle-aged,
middle class women are subject . The Washington Court of Appeals
makes no mention of Carla's weight; but that term in the agreement might
dispose a divorce court judge to assess the consequences of the agreement's
provisions more harshly against Manny than might otherwise be the case!
V.
Applying section 7.04's writing requirement to Carla and Manny's case
raises troubling questions for those who tend to focus largely on the
accomplishment of individualized justice. Carla acknowledged the
agreement and the parties clearly lived in strict accordance with it through-
fourteen years of marriage and while raising two children. If the purpose of
the writing requirement is evidentiary-to require clear proof because of the
likelihood of false claims when marital love has disappeared-why should
31. Such an offer of settlement would probably not be admissible to prove that the
contract was unfair, see WASH. R. EVID. 408, but the judge in a court trial (and the appellate
court if the trial judge held the agreement to be valid) would be aware of the offer.
32. Commenting on section 7.05(3)(c)'s criterion concerning benefit to or protection of
third parties, the Reporters assert that "whether enforcement would create a substantial injustice
rendering the agreement unenforceable depends upon the facts of the [individual] case. As a
general matter, however, the more one-sided the contract's provisions, the more likely that, at
the time of [the] divorce, its enforcement would yield a substantial injustice." Id. § 7.05 cmt. e,
at 995. Whether this suggestion was intended to apply to all the criteria of subsection (3) or
only to subsection (3)(c) is not clear. The subsection's introductory language ("a court should
consider"), id. § 7.05(3), see supra note 16 and accompanying text, as well as the illustrative
cases, suggests that the Reporters believe that section 7.05(3) gives trial judges fairly wide
discretion in giving meaning to the phrase "substantial injustice" in varied settings. See id. cmt.
b, illus. 5-11, at 991-96; see also id. § 7.05 cmt. e, at 996 (when a judge concludes that an
agreement would work a substantial injustice to the weaker spouse because of an undue
reduction in what would otherwise be the wife's total financial situation, the court "may decide,
however, that enforcement of the property term in the agreement, but not the term regarding
[denial of] compensatory payments, would yield a result that is not unjust."). This statement
suggests that trial judges have discretion to reform premarital agreements deemed unenforceable
because of "substantial injustice." On the other side, but similarly productive of discretionary
judgments, "[a] contract that makes reasonable provision[s] for the financially weaker spouse
will not yield a substantial injustice simply because its terms are much less generous than would
arise under the governing law." Id. § 7.05 cmt. e, at 995.
Mention should also be made of PRINCIPLES, section 7.05(5), the separate provision
exempting agreements waiving specific financial provisions of PRINCIPLES (those authorizing
"gradual recharacterization of separate property [to] marital property" over the term of the
marriage-and therefore making the property subject to equitable distribution) from the
procedural and substantive requirements of section 7.05. Id. § 7.05(5).
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the provision apply to Manny and Carla's situation? If the purpose of the
requirement is precautionary-the agreement "may also increase [the]
chance that both parties will give careful thought to any waiver of such
rights" 33 -wouldn't the passage of time before the marriage have been
sufficient for adequate reflection? If the broader purpose of the writing
rule is to prevent financial coercion just prior to marriage by the wealthier
and psychologically more dominant party, shouldn't lengthy and strict
voluntary adherence to the agreement's terms, no matter how unfair
outsiders to the marriage might view them, change the legal response to the
agreement? To put the matter differently, does the need to prevent false
financial claims at divorce or to deter coercive premarital financial demands
by a dominating spouse require invalidating even legitimate oral agreements
that were not coercive? Would it not make more sense to make the writing
requirement the subject of a rebuttable presumption, as the Principles do for
the thirty-day prior to marriage requirement? 3 All oral premarital financial
agreements could not possibly be coercive and therefore "unjust or
exploitative"; 35 nor should the assumption be indulged that financially
weaker spouses are "usually women' 36 who need more than a priori or
presumptive protection from scheming and/or dominating male spouses-to-
be. On the other hand, specific, enforceable rules, are needed; they are
usually designed to reinforce the wisest default position-and any rule will
prohibit (or fail to validate) some practice, some behavior, or some
agreement, that in a particular context most observers would consider it
unjust to prohibit or unjust not to validate. This is, after all, the function of
rules; and rules should be enforced.37 Whatever the just outcome might be,
in Principles jurisdictions the legal outcome of Manny and Carla's divorce
is clear: because the agreement was not in writing, Carla gets more money.
VI.
Let's return to the real (if unusual) world of Manny and Carla. The
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's enforcement of the
agreement. 38  Because the Washington legislature had not adopted the
33. PRINCIPLES, § 7.04 cmt. a, at 961.
34. Professor Bix points out that the 30-day rule was absolute in earlier drafts but later
converted to the rebuttable presumption category. Bix, supra note 10, at 236.
35. Id. at 235.
36. Id. at 241.
37. This is not the place for, nor am I a competent leader of, a discussion of jurisprudence.
But there can be no dispute about the fact that the Carla and Manny case produces conflicting
emotional and policy impulses.
38. [Carla] DewBerry v. [Emanuel] George, 62 P.3d 525 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
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Principles, a simple formula found in Washington precedent made the
agreement enforceable:
The first prong of [former case law] asks whether the agreement
made a fair and reasonable provision for the spouse not seeking
enforcement. If the answer is yes, the agreement is valid. If the
answer is no, the second prong asks whether there was full
disclosure of the value and nature of the property involved and
whether there was full knowledge and independent advice about
each spouse's rights.39
The agreement, although oral and subject to the Statute of Frauds, was
"enforceable under the part performance exception to the statute. '' 40
The judicial consideration of Manny and Carla's premarital deal may
have been colored by facts intentionally hidden earlier. Although the
agreement's terms were apparently conceived and crafted by Manny, Carla
was the party seeking enforcement twenty years later. Carla was the lawyer
who became a wealthy million-dollar-a-year rainmaker in Seattle; it was
Carla who bought the three houses to fulfill the deal. Manny, on the other
hand, had dropped his career in the entertainment and hospitality industries,
and eventually became increasingly dependent on Carla's income.
The trial court . . . found that Manny was voluntarily
underemployed because he had not worked full-time hours from
January 2000 through September 2001, the time of trial. After he
was laid off from Eddie Bauer in 1999, Manny began working the
early morning shift from 4 [a.m.] to 7 [p.m.] at UPS because it
provided steady income and benefits. It also allowed him
flexibility to pursue a career as a longshoreman and spend time
with his children. The longshoring work was assigned on a daily
basis at a dispatch hall, but because Manny lacked union
39. Id. at 531. I am over-simplifying. The court held that if this were the relevant test, the
agreement would be deemed procedurally and substantively fair and therefore enforceable. But
the Court ruled that this test, the one for agreements waiving a spouse's interest in an equitable
distribution of marital property, was not applicable to premarital agreements by "two well-
educated working professionals agreeing to preserve the fruits of their labor for their individual
benefit." Id.
40. Id. at 529. The PRINCIPLES' section 7.04 writing requirement would trump both the
statute of frauds and its part performance exception if the PRINCIPLES had been in effect in
Washington. But see PRINCIPLES § 7.04 cmt. a, at 974-75; supra note 19 and accompanying
text; infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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membership and senior status, he worked only one to two shifts
per week.4'
Obviously, as Ira observed, creating fairness rules to govern family law
issues entails painful choices: "[a]ny rule clear enough to provide
reasonably consistent and predictable judgments must be chosen from
among alternatives with equal or nearly equal claims to being fair. '42 But
Manny and Carla's case presents an especially difficult choice. Although
the Principles' legislative language, comments and illustrations are all
carefully gender neutral, it seems clear to me, relying on observations of
commentators as well as my hunches as to the intentions of the Reporters,
that the Principles have been attuned to enhancing gender fairness.
In any event, the safeguards in the Principles-both the
procedural protections of [s]ection 7.04 and the "substantial
injustice" standards of [s]ection 7.05-seem to protect weaker
partners (under our assumptions, usually women) from the worst
possible consequences of unwise choices ....
To the extent that women are often on the receiving end of many
or most of the more exploitative premarital agreements, the
adoption of the Principles for regulating premarital agreements
would be a step, though perhaps only a small one, towards greater
gender justice.43
No surprise here-gender differences and the impact of those differences on
fair legal governance of intimate relationships is an ineluctable element of
life and administration of family law; the Principles' emphasis on
delineating anew the proper respective roles of status and contract in family
dissolution is at least in part a product of our understanding of the nature of
gender relationships today and a reaction to the legal treatment of gender
differences in the immediate past.44 Indeed, there are scholars and others
who believe that in determining the enforceability of prenuptial agreements,
as well as in almost every other subject of family law doctrine, there
41. DewBerry, 62 P.3d at 528. The court of appeals affirmed a child support order for
Manny based upon an imputed income of $48,000, more than he currently made but less than
his Eddie Bauer salary. Id. at 532.
42. Ellman, supra note 3, at 707.
43. Bix, supra note 10, at 241, 244. It should be noted that Professor Bix's article was
part of a symposium on the Principles organized by the Duke Journal of Gender Law and
Policy. Emphasis in the articles in that publication on the Principles' gender consequences is
hardly surprising.
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (citing Bix).
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continues to be a need to "level the playing field" by bending the law more
toward the protection of the interests of women.45 And we should
acknowledge that judicial as well as our personal reactions to the
hypothetical Manny-Carla financial situation might well have been
inconsistent with the actual case holding-that is, if Manny were the
rainmaker and Carla was trying to prevent enforcement, the agreement
might not have withstood judicial scrutiny either under the common law orS 46
under the Principles. Many scholars and judges believe that family law
decisions, especially trial court decisions, should be driven largely by
individualized judgments of fairness, including gender fairness.47 However,
good lawmaking, by legislators or judges, should not contemplate the
differential enforcement of prenuptial agreements--either as a matter of law
45. See LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Mary Ann
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1179-82 (1986); Martha Minow, Consider the Consequences, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 900, 908 (1986); Rhode & Minow, supra note 7; Singer, supra note 7; see also Minnesota
Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final Report, 15 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 829, 842-48 (1989) (complaining that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions
interpreting the maintenance statute would not allow adequate provision for economically
dependent female divorcees. The Report failed to indicate that legislative modifications adopted
four years previously and appellate decisions interpreting the modifications had improved the
economic situation for divorcing dependent females). Asked why the legal changes were
ignored, one member of the Task Force responded, "the Report is a political document." Levy,
supra note 7, at 75 n. 114. Note also law review articles calling for a judicial return to the
"maternal presumption" in divorce-custody adjudication. See, e.g., Ramsay Laing Klaff, The
Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1982). Even some appellate opinions
take this tack. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (adopting the
Principles' custody standard; the panel majority required an order replicating each parent's pre-
divorce time with child and assigned physical custody to stay-at-home, architect father rather
than to large-firm-practicing-lawyer mother; full court withdrew panel decision and awarded
custody to mother).
46. I am obviously not talking about the contract law notion that, because the contract was
"drafted" by Manny, any ambiguities or doubts about enforceability should be resolved against
his interests, either in my "hypothetical" tending to make the agreement's unenforceable or in
the actual case favoring the agreement's enforcement.
47. Consider one trial judge's candid admission of his decisional motives (an unwise
admission, since he was reversed on appeal) in a case in which he awarded seventy-five percent
of the marital property to the husband solely because the wife's extramarital affair caused the
breakdown of a twenty-six-year marriage: "I have done some research; and as much as I want to
punish some people in a divorce, I find out that these appellate judges, who don't try divorce
cases, say that it's just unfair." Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 902 (Mich. 1992); see also
supra note 8 and accompanying text. I suspect that the Principles' "escape hatches," which
have been criticized by Professor Westfall, see supra note 7, were included at least in part
because of complaints from members of the Institute (perhaps even members of the Institute's
Council) who would have opted for considerably more trial judge discretion than the Reporters
favored.
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or as a matter of covert fact-depending upon the gender of the person
seeking enforcement. It makes no sense to go back to the age of fictions.48
On the other hand, we all believe that differential decisionmaking is an
expected, indeed an inevitable and occasionally healthy, aspect of common
law method.
Needless to say, we cannot do without binding rules and the search for
fair rules-rules that will by and large be followed-because they constrain
otherwise objectionable judicial discretion and because they guide private
negotiations. 49 The Principles' treatment of prenuptial agreements provides
a host of specific directions to guide judges considering whether to enforce
such agreements. Yet in light of all the "escape hatches" included overtly
and covertly in both sections 7.04 and 7.05,50 one begins to wonder whether
despite the apparent policy direction and actual complexity of the required
exercise, the Principles do much to make the law less discretionary. The
writing requirement is the major (if not the sole) exception; as the actual
Carla and Manny case suggests, the requirement may, if interpreted
stringently (at least occasionally today and perhaps increasingly in the
future), produce questionable results. To be sure, relevant evidence and
validity factors for judicial consideration have been specified, but the
decisional dynamic may not have been substantially constrained.5
Nonetheless, the specifications, while complex and indeterminate, serve an
important function in clearly delineating the scope and detail of the scrutiny
couples' premarital negotiations deserve and require. It is possible that the
Principles' provisions, with all their "escape hatches," may turn out to be
more conceptually useful and acceptable to trial judges exercising discretion
in the interpretation and enforcement of prenuptial agreement issues than to
legislators, and the windows the "escape hatches" provide for discretion
may allow judges to temper the chapter's policy direction as the "playing
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); cf Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function
in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495 (1992). My own marriage to inflexible rules to
constrain trial judge discretion has been troubled, if not dissolved, by acquaintance with the
often unsuccessful efforts of decent trial judges to do justice to criminal defendants despite
inflexible (especially federal) sentencing guidelines.
50. Consider especially that Principles, section 7.05(3), the substantive "substantial
injustice" provisions, merely directs courts to "consider" the four criteria examined in the text
and makes none of them absolute in the fashion of the writing requirement. See supra note 34
and accompanying text; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 17, 22, 24, 33 and 48. The perpetuation of the standard contract
"unconscionability" standard in Principles section 7.01, even if it formally concerns only
bargaining at the time of execution, adds substantially to and, I believe, encourages the exercise
of extensive trial court discretion in prenuptial agreement cases.
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field" levels. This possibility assumes, of course, that gender balance in the
judiciary will increase or that male judges' alleged sharing of society's
gender biases 52 will change in tempo with changes in the nature or usual
beneficiary of premarital agreements.
Legal rules, no matter how principled, labeled "model," or "uniform," or
something else, may be relevant and/or reflective of social needs and mores
only for a generation (if that long), for a period that reflects the world-view
of the lawmakers. No matter how carefully lawmakers (legislators, the
ALI, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
judges, and those like Ira and his Reporter colleagues who give direction to
lawmakers' endeavors) succeed in sheltering themselves from prevailing
social norms, they will universalize their experience and their values, and
those values may well not be those of the next generation.53 In 1970 the
chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Missouri Senate told a local
scholar that he had excluded the no-fault property distribution rules from
Missouri's version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act because they
would have too seriously taxed Missouri's criminal justice enforcement
resources-too many Missouri husbands would rather kill their wives than
share "their" property.54  And in 1972 the Executive Director of the
American Law Institute told a member of the Institute's Council that the
'Institute could not undertake a domestic relations project because too many
members had religious objections to divorce.
55
Today, we have a brilliant Institute endeavor on a significant aspect of
the topic, and we are close to national consensus on no-fault, equal division
of marital property at divorce. That female rainmaker divorcers are now
trying to enforce premarital agreements that disadvantage their
economically less fortunate husbands (even if the terms were originally
dictated by the husband and the circumstantial change was not anticipated)
suggests that, to whatever extent the Principles' premarital agreement
52. See Singer, supra note 7.
53. Reading these pages to help me avoid pitfalls, Brian Bix has suggested that it is at least
possible that the Reporters may have been too successful in avoiding the imposition of their
values in chapter seven of the Principles: by adding multiple "escape hatches" to avoid gender
bias favoring women, the Reporters have succeeded in creating so discretionary a system that
judges who do not favor a level "playing field" will be able to continue to validate unfair
premarital agreements that are conceived and imposed by men. Cf Simione v. Simione, 581
A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (holding that there is no need for substantive review for fairness at time of
agreement's enforcement if voluntary and adequate disclosure was made at execution).
54. This anecdote was reported to the author more than thirty years ago by a law professor
who had advocated adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act by the Missouri
legislature.
55. Id.
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strictures were designed to "protect weaker partners [who are] usually
women," 56 they may soon, as law reform periods run, become obsolete.
Thirty years have passed between promulgation of the Uniform Marriage
aid Divorce Act and publication of the American Law Institute's
Princip les-and the two endeavors are very different in policy and in
detail. 57 Family law doctrines resisted legislative change for a very long
time; they adapted (if at all) to modern values concerning family formation
and dissolution (some would call them frailties) largely by means of a host
of fictions conceived by lawyers and indulged by judges. Yet within thirty
years, family law doctrines have been the subject of two radical reform
efforts, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and the ALI's Principles.
Only eight states adopted the provisions of the Uniform Act-none of them
adopted the provisions related to marriage-and, at least at the moment,
only the West Virginia legislature has addressed the Principles, and only
the chapter dealing with custody was enacted. 58
How should we understand this situation? Should reformers (those with
real legislative clout, not wooly academics or "pointy-headed intellectuals"
peddling their own nostrums) reexamine family law at least once every
other decade, but expect that change will come, if at all, only as judges,
responding to changing community values, adopt new rules (or fictions)
"cherry-picked" from reform endeavors? This is not exactly a "glass-half-
full" prescription. On the other hand, perhaps Manny and Carla's situation
(in which an absolute writing requirement for prenuptial agreements would
disadvantage a member of the class the rule was designed to protect)
59
indicates that any legal response to what appear to be concurrent mores and
values is fraught with more risks than reformers can usually contemplate.
I intend no firm objections to Principles doctrines in this presentation.
Of this, though, we can be sure: the American Law Institute's Principles are
56. See Bix, supra note 10, at 241.
57. Some of the difference, of course, can be explained by the different composition of the
groups' memberships and how members are chosen, the great difference in the amount of
autonomy given to Reporters by the two organizations, and the constituencies to which the two
organizations respond. For a fuller description of the differences, see Robert Levy, Trends in
Legislative Regulation of Family Law Doctrine: Millennial Musings, 33 FAM. L.Q. 543, 554-55
(1999).
58. I have been told that at least one of the Advisors to the Principles, who consistently
opposed provisions of the custody chapter because it discriminated against fathers, testified in
favor of the chapter in West Virginia because its provisions were so much more acceptable than
the extant West Virginia law, a version of the "Primary Caretaker" doctrine. The issues as they
were debated in the drafting of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, are reviewed in Levy,
supra note 7 at 48-52.
59. It is possible that the Reporters may have contemplated waiver of the writing
requirement through affirmation by behavior. See supra note 2 1.
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first-rate-a magnificent accomplishment, for which the Institute, as well as
all family law scholars, legislatures, and the public are greatly indebted to
Ira and his reporter colleagues.
